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EU election observation and the April 2013 Paraguayan elections: 
context and prospects
Dr. (des.) Matteo Garavogiia
Paraguay’s political context and its 
institutional framework
Paraguay’s political system and institutional 
framework are characterized by a constant 
evolution that, following the Stroessener years. 
has struggled to adapt itself to the challenges 
arising from the instances arising both from 
domestic constituencies and by Paraguay’s 
regional partners calling for a strengthening of 
the country’s democratic process. It is within this 
institutional framework that an eventual Election 
Observation Mission (EOM) of the European 
Union to Paraguay to observe the upcoming 
legislative and presidential elections in April 2013 
would take place.
Paraguay is a bi-cameral presidential state. 
Executive powers rest with the President, who 
is elected with a plurality vote for five-year 
terms, is both Chief of State and Head of the 
Government. Legislative power rests with a 
Congress (Congreso). This is made up by an 
eighty-seats Chamber of Deputies (Camara de 
Diputados) elected for five-year terms through 
closed-list proportional representation in eighteen 
constituencies across the country. Congress is 
also constituted by a forty-five seats Chamber of 
Senators (Camara de Senadores) elected through 
closed-list proportional representation in a single 
countrywide constituency for a five-year term. 
Paraguay’s political landscape is characterized 
both by continuity and by novelty. This is 
inevitably the case in a context whereby political 
forces that have dominated the country’s political 
life for many decades are now challenged by a 
variety of new political actors.
The Asociación Nacional Republicana -  ANR 
(National Republican Association but better 
known as Partido Colorado) has without doubt 
been the dominant party of Paraguay for most of 
the country’s history. Founded in September 1887 
following the disastrous War of the Triple Alliance 
as Partido Nacional Republicano by Bernardino
Caballero, the Partido Colorado has continuously 
been the governing party of Paraguay except 
between 1904 and 1946. As the only political 
party allowed to field electoral candidates between 
1947 and 1963 and as one of the key political tools 
through which Alfredo Stroessner ruled Paraguay 
throughout his dictatorship (1954 to 1989), the 
Partido Colorado had little trouble establishing 
and strengthening its hegemony on the country. It 
was only in the years between the appointment of 
Juan Carlos Wasmosy as the first civilian President 
of the country in 1993 and the election of Nicanor 
Duarte Frutos in 2003, that the Partido Colorado 
began to lose the tight grip on power it had enjoyed 
for decades. In the first fully democratic elections 
held in the country on the 20th of April 2008, the 
candidate of the Partido Colorado, Blanca Ovelar 
(who became party leader among never-proven 
accusations of internal fraud and vote-rigging) 
conceded defeat to the candidate of the left-leaning 
Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio (APC) led by 
Fernando Lugo. With these elections, sixty-one 
years of uninterrupted Colorado rule were brought 
to an end a centre-left alliance came to power.
Established following a split within the 
Partido Colorado, the Unión Nacional de 
Ciudadanos Eticos -  UNICE (National Union 
of Ethical Citizens) is a right-wing, nationalist 
and conservative party founded in March 2002 
by former General Lino Oviedo (imprisoned in 
2004 until 2007 when Paraguay’s Supreme Court 
overturned a sentence which had condemned him 
for an alleged attempted coup d’état against the 
government in 1996). While it began political 
life as an internal current within the Partido 
Colorado when Oviedo’s supposed victory to the 
party leadership was not accepted by the Partido 
Colorado's electoral party in 1997, UNICE 
became a political force of its own in 2002 and, 
since then, it has fielded candidates in all of 
Paraguay’s elections. UNICE came third in the 
elections of the 20th of April 2008.
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The Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico - PLRA 
(Authentic Radical Liberal Party, better known as 
Partido Liberal) is a clandestine party founded 
in 1978 by Domingo Laino in the midst of the 
dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner. Aiming to 
carry forward the liberal tradition of the Liberal 
Party established in July 1887 by Antonio Taboada 
with the name of Centro Democrático, the PLRA 
is the second most significant political force 
within Paraguay and it has traditionally strived 
to give a voice to all those more liberal socio­
political forces that could not identify themselves 
with the ideology and the policies of the Partido 
Colorado. Characterized by a strong following 
among libertarian socialists, students and the 
working class and because of its opposition to the 
Partido Colorado and the Stroessner dictatorship, 
thousands of party members suffered political 
persecutions of all kinds. Following a revolution 
in 1904 and in power up to a coup in 1936, the 
PLRA came back to power in 2008 through the 
coalition constituted by the Alianza Patriótica por 
el Cambio (APC). Following the impeachment of 
President Fernando Lugo on the 22nd of June 2012, 
Federico Franco, Lugo’s vice-President and leader 
of the PLRA became President of Paraguay.
The Frente Guasú (Guarani for “Broad 
Coalition”) is a coalition of left and centre-left 
parties that came about as result of the merger 
between the Espacio Unitario -  Congreso Popular 
- EU -  CP (United Front -  Popular Congress) 
and the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio -  APC 
(National Alliance for Change). The former is 
a coalition of left-leaning parties with Marxist 
tendencies established in 2009. The latter was 
a broad coalition of various left and centre-left 
parties that, together with the PLRA, was set up 
in view of the elections of the 20th of April 2008. 
Constituted in September 2007, the Alliance won 
the 2008 elections and managed to get Fernando 
Lugo (leader of the left-leaning forces) elected as 
President of Paraguay and Federico Franco (leader 
of the PLRA) as its vice-President. Following the 
impeachment of President Lugo in June 2012, 
Federico Franco became President of Paraguay 
and the PLRA abandoned the Alliance. The roots 
for the alliance between the Alliance and the 
Espacio Unitario are to be found in a “National
Meeting of the Leadership of Progressive Forces” 
in November 2009, in a “memorandum of 
understanding” signed by the leadership of the 
PC and of the EU-CP in January 2010 and in the 
official registration of the Frente Guasú with the 
electoral tribunal in February 2010 (the coalition 
was then to officially come into being in March 
2010).
Within the political landscape presented 
above, the last popular consultations and the 
years in between these have seen have seen some 
fascinating developments. To begin with, the 
Presidential elections of the 20th of April 2008 
saw the victory of Fernando Lugo as the candidate 
of the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio (APC) 
and the end to sixty-one years of uninterrupted 
Colorado rule. Lugo obtained over 42% of 
the votes against 31% and 21% of the votes 
obtained by the Colorado and UNICE candidates 
respectively: Blanca Ovelar and Lino Oviedo. Still 
on the 20th of April 2008, the citizens of Paraguay 
went to the polls to elect a new Congress. The 
Senate saw the victory of the Partido Colorado, 
which obtained fifteen seats, followed by the 
PLRA with fourteen, seats and UNACE with 
nine seats. The Chamber of Deputies also saw 
the victory of the Partido Colorado with thirty 
seats, followed by the PLRA with twenty-seven 
and UNACE with fifteen. Following the national 
elections of April 2008, the local elections of 
November 2010 saw a general victory of the 
Partido Colorado, a good performance of the 
Frente Guasú (which came second in the capital 
Asunción) and a more modest performance of 
both the Partido Liberal and UNACE. On the 9th 
of October 2011, the citizens of Paraguay were 
once more called to the polls but, this time, for 
a referendum. With a turnout of only 13%, over 
80% of the voters agreed to amend Article 120 
of the Constitution of Paraguay in order to allow 
hundreds of thousands of Paraguayan citizens 
living outside the country’s borders to vote in all 
of Paraguay’s future political consultations.
Last in chronological order but certainly not 
less important, the events of the 22nd of June 
2012 whereby Congress, on the basis of Article 
225 of the Constitution of Paraguay, impeached 
President Fernando Lugo for, among other things,
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supposedly mismanaging the events that led 
to and followed the death of seventeen people 
within the context of the illegal invasion of the 
estate of Mr. Blas Riquelme (ex-President of 
the Partido Colorado), deserve a paragraph of 
their own. Internal documents produced by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay stress 
that the accusations moved towards President 
Lugo by Congress “mirror the disapproval of 
the Paraguayan society for the inaction of the 
government when faced with problems of all kinds. 
for the failure of President Lugo to achieve the 
objectives for which the people of Paraguay had 
elected him. for lack of transparency in its political 
conduct and for his operative inefficiency”. As 
paragraph six of Decision 26/2012 of the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR) and as the 
government of Paraguay itself has acknowledged. 
most international criticism of the impeachment 
process revolved around the limited amount of 
time that President Lugo had been accorded by 
Congress to prepare his defense (i.e. two hours) 
and around the fact that the whole impeachment 
process was concluded in less than 48 hours. 
According to internal documents published by 
the Foreign Ministry of Paraguay. the speed at 
which the Senate of Paraguay carried out the 
impeachment process was due to (1.) “ ...The 
imminent risk that he [President Lugo] would use 
his [Presidential] powers to work or to distort the 
regular course of the impeachment process” and 
(2.) due to “the existing risk of social violence 
and the loss of human lives. due to possible 
clashes between those sectors of society against 
the impeachment process and those in favor of 
it.” Within this context, it is worth observing 
that, when notified that an impeachment process 
towards him had been launched and although 
qualifying it as a “Congressional coup d’état”, 
President Lugo voluntarily submitted himself 
to the impeachment process and unequivocally 
stated that he would have accepted the result of 
the impeachment process itself.
Following the events mentioned above and after 
having temporarily recalled their ambassadors 
from Paraguay, a number of UNASUR member 
states expressed their strongest condemnation 
for “the breakdown of the democratic order in
the Republic of Paraguay”, suspended Paraguay 
from UNASUR itself, stripped Paraguay of the 
Temporary Presidency of UNASUR and passed 
this on to Peru, decided to promote through 
diplomatic channels the suspension of Paraguay 
from all relevant regional fora and established 
a high-level working group to monitor the 
situation in the country (UNASUR Decision 
26/2012). The Republic of Paraguay, from its 
side, has so far taken no significant diplomatic 
measures other than issuing a number of press 
releases and official declarations protesting its 
innocence, claiming that international institutions 
such as MERCOSUR (from which Paraguay’s 
membership has been suspended), UNASUR, the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC), the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Association for Latin 
American Integration (ALADI) acted outside the 
framework of international law and contemplating 
the recourse to international arbitration bodies 
to protect and reaffirm its international rights. 
To this day, President Lugo freely moves in and 
out of Paraguay, no state of emergency has been 
declared (despite this being allowed by Article 
288 of the Constitution) and media and political 
parties are allowed to operate reasonably freely 
across the country.
Within the context presented above, the 
European Union’s response to the unfolding 
events has been circumspect. Since the signing 
of a bilateral Framework Cooperation Agreement 
with Paraguay in 1992 and the signing of an 
EU-MERCOSUR Framework Cooperation 
Agreement in 1995, the European Union has 
consistently framed its ‘Paraguay policy’ within 
the broader context of Brussels’ relationship with 
UNASUR and MERCOSUR (with which the EU 
is negotiating a deeper association agreement). 
Indeed, the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper 
(revised in 2010) and the 2007-2013 Regional 
Strategy Paper form the current bedrock of 
the Union’s relationship with Asuncion and 
the broader region. Within this framework and 
following the events which led to President’s 
Lugo impeachment, a fact-finding mission made 
up by eight MEPs (led by Luis Yanez-Barnuevo, 
MEP) tasked with assessing the situation in
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the country traveled to Paraguay. Following 
the MEPs’ visit, the EU’s posture towards 
Paraguay has been characterized by a mix of both 
accommodating and confrontational measures. On 
the one hand, the European Union has maintained 
his stated support to Paraguay’s economy by 
keep granting it preferential treatment. Indeed, 
as of January Ist, 2014, all MERCOSUR member 
states except Paraguay will be de-listed from 
the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP). On the other hand, Brussels has openly 
stated its concern for the country’s deteriorating 
democratic credentials and suspended all talks for 
an EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement until 
after the Paraguayan legislative and Presidential 
elections scheduled for April 2013. It is within this 
evolving political landscape that the Carter Center, 
the Organization of American States (which, 
unlike MERCOSUR, did not suspend Paraguay’s 
membership) and, notably, the European Union 
are contemplating the possibility of deploying 
election observation missions to the Republic of 
Paraguay for the upcoming elections on the 21st of 
April 2013.
Election observation missions (EOMs): a key 
tool of EU foreign policy
The legal basis for EU election observation 
missions is enshrined in Article 21 of the Treaty 
on the European Union. This states, among other 
things, that “The Union’s action on the international 
scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation [...] democracy, the rule 
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.” Furthermore, 
the same article claims that “The Union shall 
define and pursue common policies and actions, 
and shall work for a high degree of cooperation 
in all fields of international relations, in order 
to: “[...] consolidate and support democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law.”
The legal basis for EU election observation 
is enshrined within a broader policy framework 
that sees the promotion of democracy, good 
governance and human rights as one of the 
cornerstones of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Indeed, such commitment
is highlighted by a number of elements. To begin 
with, already in the year 2000, the European 
Commission published an official communication 
on EU election observation missions stressing 
the fundamental role that these have to play in 
assisting partner countries in consolidating their 
democratic credentials. Secondly, since the 1990s, 
the European Union has a long-standing and 
successful division of labor with the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
whereby this, through its Warsaw-based ODIHR 
office carries out election observation missions 
in Europe, the Community of Independent States 
(CIS) and Central Asia, while the EU focuses its 
EOMs on the other regions of the globe. Thirdly, 
the European Union has established a dedicated 
funding line for the promotion of democratic 
processes in general and its election observation 
activities in particular. The European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is in 
this respect pivotal in providing the Union with 
a sound financial basis for its work dedicated to 
the promotion of democracy and human rights. 
Last but not least, it shall be noted that EOMs 
are a separate yet absolutely complementary 
activity that the Union carries out together with its 
electoral assistance work whereby, as opposed to 
only observing the quality of the electoral process 
as done through its EOMs, the EU actively 
contributes to the set up, the organization and the 
implementation of electoral consultations.
The legal basis and the policy framework 
within which the European Union caries out its 
election observation missions are embedded within 
a constantly evolving political context. Examples 
of such evolving conditions that contribute to 
influence the political environment within which 
the EU might launch its EOMs abound. The 
De Keyser report, for instance, has called for a 
paradigm shift in the EU’s focus of its activities 
away from “stability and security” towards 
“democracy and human rights”. Following the 
report, in 2011, the Union’s High Representative 
(HR) and the Commission felt compelled to 
release a joint communication on “Human Rights 
and Democracy at the Heart of EU External 
Action”. Finally and most recently, a new joint 
communication on the European Neighborhood
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Policy (ENP) titled “A new response to a changing 
neighborhood” further highlighted the European 
Union’s institutions awareness of the need to be 
in step with the rapidly evolving human rights 
situation in the Middle East and Near Africa 
(MENA) region. An awareness that turned out to 
be something more concrete than a mere policy 
declaration with the establishment, in 2012, of a 
dedicated budget line in the form of a “European 
Endowment for Democracy”.
As it can be evinced from what mentioned 
above, through its election observation missions, 
the European Union aims to achieve a number 
of objectives. To begin with, EU EOMs can 
contribute to decrease the likelihood of fraud 
or harassment throughout an election: the 
presence of independent and neutral international 
observers is in itself an incentive for all parties 
involved in a country’s election to comply with 
internationally and regionally agreed standards 
and best practices. Secondly, EOMs assess 
electoral campaigns and voting procedures 
against international benchmarks and therefore 
can provide an evaluation of a country’s electoral 
process. Thirdly, EOMs provide the international 
community with a “snapshot” of the human rights 
situation, the state of the rule of law and the 
democratic processes taking place in the country 
in question. Last but not least, following an EOM, 
the European Union can assist and support selected 
countries to improve the modus operandi through 
which its elections are carried out, thus benefitting 
the country’s overall democratic process. While 
the Union aims to achieve the above-mentioned 
objectives, it is fundamental to observe that, at 
no time, EU EOMs validate a country’s electoral 
process or endorse an electoral result. A policy, 
this one, that is specifically designed with the 
objective of highlighting the Union’s neutrality 
and independence vis-à-vis all political actors 
involved in the election, thus enhancing the EOMs 
legitimacy and status in the eyes of these.
In order to carry out its mandate, a EU EOM 
relies on the work of its Brussels HQ and the 
mission itself deployed on the field in the country 
in question. The “Brussels dimension” of an 
EU EOM is primarily constituted by the work 
carried out by the European External Action
Service (EEAS). This embryo of a pan-European 
diplomatic service coordinates the EU mission 
with other international observation missions, 
UN agencies and foreign diplomatic missions. 
Furthermore, it supervises the flow of information 
within the EU itself by involving the Commission, 
the European Parliament (EP) and the member 
states while at the same time keeping constantly 
in contact with the chief observer and the head of 
mission in the field. It is in Brussels and through 
the EEAS itself, that the HR / VP will, following 
the closing of the voting procedures, issue a first 
official statement on behalf of the Union as a 
whole.
Supported by the EEAS in Brussels, the 
EOM proper on the field consists of a series of 
actors that, together, contribute to the successful 
discharge of the mission’s mandate. To begin with, 
the HR in close consultation with the EP appoints 
a head of mission and, sometimes, a deputy head 
of mission. Together with a delegation of MEPs 
that might or not visit the country in question, 
the head of mission (usually a prominent MEP) 
provides the “political dimension” of the EOM. 
A more “technical dimension” is brought to 
the mission by the body of experts that make 
up the mission’s core team. These are selected 
directly by the Commission, are often deployed 
for months preceding election day itself and, a s 
rule, include an observer coordinator, a deputy 
observer coordinator, an election or legal analyst, 
a political analyst, a press officer, a media analyst, 
a statistician, a logistician, a security expert and a 
CFO. The core team supervises a group of Long­
Term Observers (LTOs). Nominated by member 
states but selected by the Commission, these are 
deployed for a number of weeks, always already 
have extensive election observation experience 
and are responsible for the observation of the 
electoral process in selected regions or districts 
of the country in question. Last but not least and 
falling in turn under the supervision of the LTOs, 
Short-Term Observers (STOs) are again proposed 
by member states but ultimately selected by the 
Commission, usually work in teams of two and 
are deployed for only a few days in order to 
observe the election day itself and the immediate 
days before and after it. The deployment of
7
election observers is only one step within the 
broader implementation of an election observation 
mission of the European Union. Indeed, each 
mission should be understood as an operation 
implemented in four fundamental steps.
A first exploratory phase of a possible EOM 
takes place nine to four months before election 
day: this phase is characterized by the inclusion of 
a selected country in a list of “priority countries” 
that the Union is particularly interested to focus on 
from a geopolitical perspective. This phase might 
also see the deployment of an exploratory (i.e. 
fact-finding) mission tasked with investigating 
whether or not the conditions for an eventual EU 
EOM are in place. It is then about four months 
before a scheduled election that, following the 
official invitation of a country in question to 
observe the elections and the eventual decision 
on behalf of the HR / VP to launch a mission, 
that a memorandum of understanding between 
the European Union and the country in question 
is signed and the EU EOM mission is officially 
launched.
The pre-election phase takes place four months 
to six weeks before the scheduled elections. At 
this stage, the HR / VP appoints a Head of Mission 
(usually a prominent MEP selected in close 
consultation with the EP). Furthermore, a Core 
Team of six to ten election observation specialists 
is brought together by the European Commission. 
Also at this stage, the EEAS and the Commission 
identify the logistical, administrative, budgetary, 
security and operational needs to be taken into 
account while launching the EOM. Within this 
framework, potential service providers (i.e. 
UNOPS, GIZ, IOM) are sought in order to give 
operational support to the mission. These are 
invited to send in competitive offers that are to 
be evaluated by an independent panel of experts 
within two weeks of the launch of the call for 
applications. Last but not least, it is at this stage 
that both LTOs and STOs are suggested by the 
MSs and ultimately selected and recruited by the 
Commission.
The election phase itself runs from six 
weeks before to two weeks after Election Day. 
Throughout this phase, the EOM carries out the 
bulk of its activities by releasing flash bulletins
and interim reports, and by releasing a first official 
preliminary statement through a well-advertised 
press conference within forty-eight hours of the 
closure of polling stations. The European Union 
is likely to launch a EOM only within the broader 
framework of long-term cooperation with the 
country in question and with a holistic policy 
approach careful to engage in a comprehensive 
manner the country’s institutions and civil society 
well before and after the election itself. Within this 
understanding, an EOM will of course observe the 
electoral process itself including, among others, 
voters registration, media coverage, voting, 
counting and tabulation of results, complaints 
and appeals. The European Union will, however, 
go beyond observing the electoral process 
itself onto exploring the electoral context, and, 
more specifically, issues such as the legislative 
framework and its implementation, the political 
parties’ campaigning activities, the role of civil 
society, the role of state institutions and the state’s 
administrative capacity.
A fourth and fundamental post-election 
phase characterizes every EU EOM. Between 
two weeks to six months after the election, the 
European Union takes a number of key steps in 
relation with the EOM that has been carried out. 
To begin with, a final comprehensive report is 
published usually within two months from the day 
of the elections. This report is of course presented 
to both the national authorities of the country 
under investigation as well as to the broader 
international community. As a second step, a 
follow up mission to the country in question 
might take place. Ideally, such a mission has, as 
its main objective, the sharing of information, of 
best practices and advice with the country that 
has held its elections. The aim is, therefore, to 
contribute to enhance the quality of the electoral 
process and of democratic practices so that the 
country in question could benefit from the EU’s 
input and review its practices. As a third step, a 
variety of workshops, roundtables and seminars 
takes place in order for the EU to take stock of 
its “lessons learnt” so as to improve its activities 
in future EOMs. As a fourth step, the EEAS and 
the Commission aim to disseminate the EOM’s 
findings to all EU institutions and members states
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so that these are kept abreast of the developments 
taking place in the country in question in the 
field of electoral practice, human rights and 
democratization. Finally, issues of democratic 
governance, human rights and the rule of law 
are incorporated within the broader context of 
EU development aid programs and the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy towards the 
country in question.
Prospects and recommendations for an 
eventual EU EOM to Paraguay
In light of the political context and the institutional 
framework that currently characterize Paraguay 
as well as having highlighted the key dimensions 
characterizing the European Union’s election 
observation missions, an eventual EU EOM 
to Paraguay on the occasion of the April 2013 
legislative and presidential elections, might wish 
to consider paying particular attention to a number 
of issues.
To begin with, the role of the Partido Colorado 
within the electoral campaign and the electoral 
process is worth being investigated. Because of 
historical reasons and its close association with 
the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, over the 
last six decades the party has, almost inevitably, 
managed to penetrate nearly every aspect of 
Paraguay’s political, economic and cultural life. To 
this day and despite the democratization process 
that has slowly taken place in Paraguay over the 
last two decades, plenty of evidence suggests 
that the Partido Colorado is part and parcel of a 
system of personal connections, vested interests 
and informal relationships that might allow it, 
to a certain degree, to act as a “state within the 
state”. Having said so, the Partido Colorado 
undoubtedly is a tremendously well-organized 
political machine (at least by local standards), 
with solid support among a very significant part 
of Paraguay’s electorate, undergoing a significant 
process of internal political renewal (i.e. through 
internal party primary elections to be held on the 
9th of December 2012) and officially committed 
to the democratic process. Because of the reasons 
mentioned above, the Partido Colorado will most 
likely play a pivotal role in ensuring whether or 
not the electoral process leading to the 21st of
April 2013 elections is seen as transparent, free 
and fair.
Secondly, the role that could potentially be 
played by Paraguayan citizens resident abroad 
should be analyzed. Reliable estimates of the total 
number of Paraguayan citizens resident abroad 
are extremely hard to come by but range from 
anything between half a million to two and a half 
million. Within the context of a country of less 
than six and a half million citizens with less than 
three and a half million registered voters such as 
Paraguay, Paraguayan citizens resident abroad 
could play a fundamental role in determining the 
result of any electoral consultation. Unfortunately, 
so far it seems like that the registration process 
of Paraguayan citizens living abroad into the 
country’s electoral registries has been very slow 
and extremely limited at best, thus de facto 
disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of citizens 
and voters. Reasons for such a state of affairs 
can range from the Paraguayan’s state limited 
administrative capacity to the unwillingness of 
a number of Paraguayans illegally living abroad 
to register themselves with local and Paraguayan 
authorities for fear of being fined or deported. 
Solid evidence of whether or not there might also 
exist a vested interest on behalf of any Paraguayan 
political parties to hamper the process of electoral 
registration of constituencies of citizens living 
abroad in order to increase the likelihood of them 
winning the elections could not be collected at 
this stage.
Last but not least, a European Union’s EOM 
to the Republic of Paraguay on the occasion of 
the 21st of April 2013 presidential and legislative 
elections might wish to explore the role that the 
country’s armed forces are playing in the run up 
to election day. Although officially signing up 
to democratic values and under the control of 
the civilian leadership, the Paraguayan armed 
forces have traditionally played a pivotal role in 
the country’s domestic politics and currently find 
themselves in a situation of particular distress. 
Three elements contribute to upset internal 
dynamics within the armed forces. Firstly, 
while in office, President Lugo had repeatedly 
reshuffled the top brass of all the three branches 
of the armed forces. Secondly, former General
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Lino Oviedo and his followers (also known as 
Oviedistas) traditionally held and possibly still 
hold extremely close links with extreme right- 
wing elements within Paraguay’s armed forces. 
Thirdly, the appearance of previously unknown 
guerrilla groups in the Chaco region under the 
Lugo’s presidency and the opposition’s perceived 
inability of the president to deal with such a 
threat, have re-ignited calls from UNICE and, to a 
more limited extent, the Partido Colorado for the 
army to be given a more prominent role to play in 
domestic politics, at least at the Chaco region.
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